Falun Gong’s counter media campaign by Yu, Haiqing
Falun Gong’s Counter Media Campaign 
Posted on Sunday, 14 November 2004 @ 00:00:00 by Jodi Crome 
By Haiqing Yu 
Introduction 
Much literature has been written on Chinese government’s persecutions of Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa, 
a self-cultivation and quasi-religious qigong practice banned in China since July 1999. Falun Gong has 
been making headlines in the world media as a champion of human rights and victim of violations of 
human rights in China. While Chinese government’s campaigns against Falun Gong and cults are 
worth noting, it is equally fascinating to note Falun Gong’s worldwide protests against the persecutions 
as constituting a new protest culture in the 21st century.  
The Counter Media Campaign 
Falun Gong’s protests against the persecutions by the Chinese government combine the traditional 
forms of protests (e.g. taking to the streets and Tiananmen Square) with a new form of protests—using 
the media to stage a counter media campaign against its persecutors. The counter media campaign 
has proven to be the most effective means to sustain its transnational growth and influence despite 
various efforts by the Chinese government to crush the “cult” in China and defame it outside China.  
Li Hongzhi and his Falun Gong disciples are media savvy. They have skillfully used Western media’s 
interests in human rights issues by presenting themselves as victims of a totalitarian and communist 
regime that is notorious for human rights violations. Through victimisation and self-victimisation, Falun 
Gong has managed to stay being the headline news in the world media (at least for three years since it 
was banned in China in 1999). Falun Gong disciples have also skillfully used their own global media 
networks composed of the Internet, newspapers, magazines, media production studios, radio, and 
television broadcasting units to stage a counter media campaign, or to use their words, to “send forth 
righteous thoughts” to the world. In the counter media campaign, Falun Gong poses itself not only as a 
self-promoter and public relations expert, but also as a media watcher, analyst, usurper, and dissector.  
Inside China, Falun Gong followers have changed their strategies from staging a high profiled 
showdown in protests and demonstrations on Tiananmen Square to staging a high profiled media 
campaign against the state authorities after the traditional channel of protests was blocked. So far, the 
staged strategies include sending a barrage of mysterious, automated voice messages praising Falun 
Gong to mainland telephone users, slipping pro-Falun Gong contents into Chinese official newspapers, 
and sabotaging local terrestrial and cable TV transmission systems to relay their own print and video 
materials. The guerrilla media warfare became a bold, concerted, and high-profile media protest when 
Falun Gong disciples hijacked Sinosat 1, the satellite that transmits China’s satellite broadcasting 
programs, to insert pro-Falun Gong videos and slogans to Chinese audiences. During the World Cup 
soccer finals between 23 June and 30 June 2002, nine channels of CCTV (Central China Television) 
and at least ten provincial TV channels were usurped by Falun Gong. Since then on almost every 
important occasion, such as the anniversaries of Hong Kong’s return to China (1 July), the National 
Day (1 October), and the Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), Falun Gong has broken into the state 
media vectors to stage mediatised protests.  
Outside China, Falun Gong has kept vigilant of its images presented in both Western and Chinese 
media. While encouraging Western media to use less pejorative language (as in changing terms “cult” 
to more neutral ones such as “sect” or “movement”) and to present a favorable image of it, Falun Gong 
has been trying to refute every accusation by the Chinese government through content analyses and 
dissections of audio-video footages from the Chinese state media. “A Staged Tragedy: Self-Immolation 
in Tiananmen Square—Analysis of CCTV’s Video Tape of January 23, 2001,” one of Falun Gong’s 
“truth clarification” series, is such an example. Through scene-by-scene news dissection and frame-by-
frame video analysis, the program exposes the tricks of news fabrication (hence false accusations on 
Falun Gong) in Chinese media’s representations of the “cult.”  
Falun Gong’s global visibility directly relates to and results from its strategic use of the media to stage 
a series of protests. The Internet especially has become a key medium in the counter campaigns 
against persecutions. Many observers have noted Falun Gong’s high-profile presence on the Internet. 
Danny Schetcher, for example, points out that the Falun Gong story appears to be “as much about 
technology as it is about religion; it offers a fascinating glimpse of an ancient religious tradition that is 
mutating rapidly as it makes the leap into cyberspace.” The Internet is the major tool of communication, 
organisation, and mobilisation for Li Hongzhi and the leadership of Falun Gong. It also constitutes an 
important part of being a Falun Gong practitioner. Through the Internet, concerted actions can be 
taken among Falun Gong practitioners all over the world. From the April25 (1999) Zhongnanhai protest, 
the annual Falun Dafa Day (13 May), global Dafa conferences, to the global trial on Jiang Zemin 
(former Chinese president who was responsible for the persecutions of Falun Gong), the Internet is 
constituted as the medium of protests. Because of the centrality of the Internet in organising and 
mobilising protests, Falun Gong is described by Karaflogka as one of the “New Cyberreligious 
Movements,” (NCRMs) and by Thornton a kind of “new cybersects.”  
Conclusion 
Falun Gong’s counter media campaign signifies a new era of protests in Chinese political culture. 
Never before in Chinese history has any organisation, group, or party been able to pose an open 
protest against the ruling authorities through the power of the media as Falun Gong does. Falun 
Gong’s concerted and consistent efforts to stage the counter media campaign against the Chinese 
government are illustrations of how cyber-networked and mediatised protests can mobilise and 
accumulate social capitals across spatial and temporal disparities, and how an alternative ideology can 
be sustained through transnational visuality of dissent.  
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Notes 
1. Since 2002 Falun Gong followers had broken into local terrestrial television broadcasts in North-east 
China and hacked into cable television networks in half-a-dozen different cities including Laiyang, 
Yantai, Chongqing, Changchun and Harbin. David Murphy, "China—Mixing Signals," Far Eastern 
Economic Review 11 July 2002. Also see “Falun Gong saboteurs nabbed in Jilin,” People’s Daily, 
available from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200204/02/eng20020402_93317.shtml (20 January 
2004) 
2. For Chinese official accounts of Falun Gong hijacking Chinese satellite broadcasting, see “special 
reports” from http://www.zhengqing.net.cn/weixing/index.htm (24 March 2004). 
3. The video is made into VCD and distributed free around the world. It is also accessible from major 
Falun Gong websites. For example: www.minghui.org/mh/articles/2001/10/1/17092.html, 
www.clearwisdom.net/emh/special_column/self-immolation.html (20 March 2004) 
4. For examples, see John Wong, "The Mystery of Falun Gong: Its Rise and Fall in China," The 
Mystery of China’s Falun Gong: Its Rise and Its Sociological Implications (Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Co., 1999). Stephen D. O’Leary, "Falun Gong and the Internet," Falun Gong’s Challenge to 
China: Spiritual Practice or “Evil Cult", ed. Danny Schechte (New York: Akashic Books, 2000). 
5. Danny Schechter, Falun Gong’s Challenge to China, 2000, p. 190. 
 
 
